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1. Introduction 
Several studies have documented that intertemporal water allocation in Hawaii (as 
elsewhere) is inefficient (see e.g., Moncur et. al., 1998).  The result is widely expected to 
be early depletion of groundwater resources and the resulting need for using expensive 
and exotic technologies such as desalination. The problem is further complicated by the 
presence of saltwater underneath most of the freshwater lenses in Hawaii. Increasing 
groundwater extraction over time will drive the freshwater head levels lower until the 
existing well installations will start to pump out saltwater. Once the wells become saline, 
it is very hard to reverse the process. The consequences of these conditions, in terms of 
the economic value of waste, are unknown. 
 
Moreover, recharge of groundwater aquifer is affected by the condition of forested 
watersheds. Amount and nature of vegetation cover affects the rate of recharge and the 
amount of groundwater stored in an aquifer available for pumping. Many communities 
have given watersheds a practice of protective zoning that eliminated the worst threats, 
including road construction and subsequent urbanization that significantly reduce 
permeability and recharge rates. Zoning alone may no longer be sufficient for meeting the 
increasing demand for fresh water, however. Increasing threats to forest quality, 
including change in forest composition due to the rapidly growing problem of invasive 
species, may justify significant conservation expenditures. Maintenance of watersheds 
needs to be considered in an integrated framework in order to assess the size of the 
problem and the potential gains from policy reforms. The overall objective of this paper is to combine existing hydrological, engineering, and 
economic knowledge in order to estimate efficient water use in the Honolulu aquifer zone 
on Oahu, HI. We compare welfare gains under efficient pricing and usage with welfare 
under current pricing and usage. In addition, we incorporate the effects of watershed 
conservation in the form of probabilistic changes in recharge. We then compare the 
welfare gains from efficient pricing without water conservation to that with watershed 
conservation. Finally, we articulate practical pricing schemes (particularly block pricing) 
for achieving efficient use with return of water pricing revenue back to the consumers. 
We derive efficient water use and prices over time for the study area with and without the 
watershed conservation plan proposed by the state Department of Land and Natural 
Resource (DLNR). Present values of status-quo (pricing-at-cost), efficiency pricing 
alone, and efficiency pricing with additional conservation spending are compared. We 
show that efficiency pricing alone provides substantial welfare gains over status-quo. 
Efficiency pricing combined with watershed conservation improves the welfare further.  
Under plausible parameter values, the fall in efficiency prices afforded by conservation is 
more than enough to finance the conservation expenditures. This is a ‘win-win-win’ for 
water consumers, taxpayers, and environment. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the basic models for efficient 
water extraction and prices with and without conservation.  Section 3 discusses the 
methodology for numerical solution and presents the results. Section 4 concludes and 
provides direction for future research. 
 2. The Model 
Following Krulce et. al. (1997), we construct a model of optimal water pricing over time. 
The demand for water as a function of price grows over time due to population and 
income growths.  There are two possible sources of water – groundwater aquifer and 
desalted water. The use of the later source applies when the cost of extracting water from 
the aquifer becomes high enough to warrant the use of more expensive, desalting 
technology, or when the aquifer head level reaches the minimum below which the aquifer 
will turn saline (the head level is constrained from below to avoid causing such salinity). 
The head level is affected by water recharge, leakage, and water extraction. 
 
Let h be the head level above sea level.  At lower head levels, it is more expensive to 
extract water because the water must be pumped longer vertical distance, and the water 
may become brackish and need to be diluted.  The average extraction cost is modeled as a 
positive, decreasing, convex function of the head,  , where ch , 
and  .  The total cost of extracting water from the aquifer at the rate q 
given head level h is c(h)q. The study area is a coastal aquifer and freshwater leaks into 
the sea from its ocean boundary. We model leakage as a positive, increasing, convex 
function of head, lh , where lh and l(0)=0.  As the head level rises, 
more water can leak to the sea.  When the head level is low, these leakages are reduced 
because of a smaller leakage surface area and less water pressure.  When the aquifer is 
empties, the leakage equals to zero.  
( ) 0 ch≥
, ≥
( ) 0, ( ) 0 ch ′′ ′ <≥
0 lim ( ) h ch → =∞
() 0 ≥ () 0 , () 0 lh ′′ ′ >
 The dynamic of the head level is governed by water inflow, leakage, and extraction.  
Recharge rate from the rain percolation and watershed is fixed at w.   If the aquifer is not 
exploited, the head will rise to the highest level h , where leakage exactly equal balances 
inflow,  () . wl h =  As the head cannot rise above this level,   whenever the 
aquifer is being exploited.  Because inflow offsets leakage and extraction, the aquifer 
head evolves over time as hw . 
( ) 0 wl h −>




A hypothetical social planner chooses the extraction rate of water from the aquifer to 
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r = discount rate  
t = time from the benchmark period to the current period 
c
q = cost of extracting unit volume of water.  
b(t) = backstop quantity consumed at time t  
c
b = cost of desalting unit volume of water. 
x = variable of integration for the water quantity demanded 
D
-1(x, t) = inverse demand function: the price at time t  
h(t) = head level (in million gallons) at time t in the aquifer 
hS =  sustainable head level. 
γ = factor to convert volume of water in gallons to head level in feet.  
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are as follows 
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0 ≤   if < then bt = 0. 
To solve the system of equations, we define the optimal price path as  .  
Assuming that the cost of desalination is high enough so that water is always extracted 
from the aquifer, condition (3) holds with equality and yields the in situ shadow price of 
water, as the royalty (i.e., price less unit extraction cost). 
1() tt t t pD qb
− ≡+
(5)    ( ) tt t pc h λ =−
By rearranging equation (2), arbitrage condition is defined as equation (6) below.  
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This implies that at the margin, the benefit of extracting water must equal the total cost of 
extracting water, i.e., price equals to cost plus marginal user cost (MUC).  
Rewriting equation (4) yields (7)   if < then   
b
t pc ≤ 0 t b =
Desalination will not be used if its cost is higher than the price of freshwater. When 
desalination is used, price must exactly equal the cost of the desalted water. (We can 
substitute  into (5) to get   whenever desalination is used).  Taking 
this expression and its time derivative and combining these with equations (1) and (2) by 
eliminating  and h , yields 
b
t pc =
, , t λλ &
( )
b
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Since  and   the h that solves (8) is unique. Whenever 
desalination is being used, the aquifer head is maintained at this optimal level denoted as 
. At  , water extracted from the aquifer equal the net inflow to the aquifer.  That 
is  .  Excess of quantity demanded is supplied by desalinated water at the 
price equals to  . Once the desalination begins, from (7)   and from (8) 
 the system reaches a steady state at the price  and the aquifer head 
level h*. Since we impose a minimum head-level constraint (h
0, 0, 0, 0, ccw ll ′′ ′ ′ <≥− > >
* h
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b c
s), the head level must not 
fall below the minimum because that would induce salinity in some of the existing 
freshwater wells. This is ensured by adding a step component to the cost function defined 
above. This step component is zero when the head level is equal or greater than   but 
takes on a very large value when the head level falls below the minimum. It becomes 
suboptimal to drive the head below h
s h
s. Thus h* ≥ hs. However, if h* > hs, more water can be extracted from the aquifer and welfare can be increased. This gives h* =hs at the 
optimum. 
The solution to the optimal control problem is governed by the system of differential 
equations: 
(7)    ( ) tt hw l h q =− − &
t
t (8)         ( ( ))( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) tt t t t pr l h p c h w l h c h ′′ =+ − +− &
where equation (7) is the same as equation (1), and equation (8) results from combining 
equations (1), (2), and (5) and the time derivative of (5) by eliminating  and h   , , tt λλ &
t &
 
To include the effects of watershed quality on aquifer recharge, we assume that there is ρe 
probability that at a definite time (te) a bad event will happen.  A bad event is an adverse 
change in forest composition that decreases the amount of water recharge from w to wlow 
affecting the head level equation of motion.  If the bad event does not occur (the 
probability of which is ρne =1 - ρe), the aquifer recharge will remain at w. The 
hypothetical social planner does not know beforehand whether or not the event will occur 
at time te and has to take into account the event probability while pricing and extracting 
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Next section discusses the solution methods used and the results obtained for the 
modified optimal control problem.  
 
3. Numerical Methodology and Results 
 
For measurements and hydrological modeling of the basal lens of Honolulu aquifer, the 
volume of water stored in the aquifer is a direct function of head but also depends on the 
aquifers boundaries, lens geometry, and aquifer porosity (Mink 1980). The upper and 
lower surfaces of the aquifers are nearly flat.  Thus, volume of aquifer storage is modeled 
as linearly related to head level. Using aquifer dimensions
1 and effective rock porosity of 
10%, Honolulu aquifer has 61 billion gallons of water stored per foot of head.  This value 
is used to calculate a conversion factor from head level in feet to volume in billion 
gallons.  Extracting 1 billion gallons of water from the aquifer would lower the head by 
1/61 or 0.0163934 feet. 
 
1 For calculations and solution procedures in this paper, please contact Basharat Pitafi 
(basharat@hawaii.edu).  
The natural inflow to the aquifer is on average 157 million gallons per day (mgd).   
Leakage from the aquifer is quadratically related to head as 
, where l(h) is measured in mgd.  The maximum head 
level, obtained when no water is extracted from the aquifer and recharge rate and leakage 
are in balance, can be calculated by solving  , which gives 
2 ( ) 0.24972 0.022023 lh h h =+
( ) wl h = 25.03 h = feet.  Since 
head level can never exceed this maximum value or be negative, l(h) is restricted to the 
domain (0, 25.03) over which  .     0, 0 ll ′′ ′ >>
 
The minimum allowable head level is calculated to be 15 feet. This is based on the 
current depth of the saltwater interface at the deepest well location in the study area. This 
well will be the first to go saline as the freshwater head level will fall and the saltwater 
interface will rise to meet the well bottom (thereby, making it saline). This will happen 
when the head level has fallen to 15 feet (using the ratio of the depth of freshwater 
surface to that of the saltwater surface of 1:40 in a Ghyben-Herzberg freshwater lens, see 
Mink 1980). The initial head level (  at this location is 22 feet.  Initial average 




We model demand with a constant elasticity demand function that grows over time at a 
constant rate.  Thus,  , where g is the growth rate of demand 
equals to the income and population growth rate of island,  is the wholesale price of 
water,   is the distribution cost, and 
(, ) ( )
gt




D c η is the elasticity of demand.  The growth rate of demand equals to 10%.  The distribution cost is calculated from the difference between 
the initial average retail price and the pumping cost.    The average price has been 
estimated at $1.97 per thousand gallons (Board of Water Supply 2002).  Thus,   = 1.97 
- $0.16 = $1.81.  Following Krulce et. al. (1997), we take the price elasticity of demand, 
D c
η = -0.25.  The parameter  is chosen to normalize the demand to actual price and 
quantity data.  Total pumpage average 218.67 mgd (Board of Water Supply 2002). 
Because the retail price was $1.97 per thousand gallons, this gives  , with demand 
measured in mgd and price in dollars per thousand gallons. The unit cost of desalination 
is estimated at $7 per thousand gallons, so that  =7.  Following Krulce et. al. (1997), we 





We analyze three scenarios of water usage/pricing: 1) efficient pricing with watershed 
conservation, 2) efficient pricing with no watershed conservation, and 3) status-quo, 
which involves pricing water at extraction and delivery cost and provides no watershed 
conservation. 
 
3.1. Efficient pricing with watershed conservation 
 
The first scenario assumes that there is adequate conservation to make the probability of 
the adverse watershed event equal to zero. Thus, there is no loss of recharge over time 
and model (1) applies with the corresponding solution method. 
 The results in the Fig.1 and Fig.2 show that the backstop will be reached in 51 years as 
the efficiency price rises from $0.4 to $7.0, and the head level from the current 22 feet to 
the minimum allowable 15 feet.  
Honolulu, Efficiency pricing with no loss of recharge (conservation) 
 
Figure 1 



























3.2. Efficient pricing with no watershed conservation  
For this scenario, we assume the time at which the adverse watershed event can occur is 
at the end of 20 years from now. The probability of such an event is assumed to be 10 %, and if it occurs, the aquifer recharge after 20 years will be reduced by 30%. We apply 
model (2) for this scenario and divide the time horizon into two stages. Stage 1 is the 
period of first 20 years (before the adverse event can occur) and stage 2 is the period 
afterwards. Stage 2 has two cases: a) adverse watershed event does not occur (probability 
90%) and aquifer recharge does not decrease; b) the event does occur (probability 10%) 
and aquifer recharge decreases by 30 %.  
 
The solution procedure for each case of stage 2 is the same as the procedure for scenario 
1. The boundary conditions are the backstop price and the beginning head level. The 
backstop price is the same as for scenario 1, and the beginning head level for stage 2 is 
equal to the ending head level for stage 1.  
 
For stage 1, we obtain the price and head paths by following the corresponding equations 
of motion, starting from the current head level and an appropriately chosen beginning 
price such that the price at the end of stage 1 is equal to the probability weighted average 
of the beginning prices of the two sub-scenarios of stage 2. 
 
The results show that if the adverse watershed event does not occur, the backstop will be 
reached in 51 years as the efficiency price rises from $0.45 to $7.0 (in the Fig.3, 4), and 
the head level from the current 22 feet to the minimum allowable 15 feet (Fig. 6, 7). If the 
adverse event does occur, the backstop will be reached in 30 years as the efficiency price 
rises from $0.45 to $7.0 (in the Fig.3, 5), and the head level from the current 22 feet to 
the minimum allowable 15 feet (Fig. 6, 8).  Honolulu, Efficiency Pricing (No Conservation) 
Stage 1 (20 years) 
Figure 3 
















Stage 2: Event does not occur (Probability 90 %) – no loss of recharge 
Figure 4 















Stage 2: Event occurs (Probability 10 %) – 30 % loss of recharge 
Figure 5 









Dollars Optimal Price and Cost
Price
Cost
 Honolulu, Efficiency Pricing (No Conservation) 
Stage 1 (20 years) 
Figure 6 











Event does not occur (Probability 90 %) – no loss of recharge 
Figure 7 











Event occurs (Probability 10 %) – 30 % loss of recharge 
Figure 8 








  3.3. Status-quo 
For scenario 3 (status-quo), we derive the extraction rates dictated by demand resulting 
from continuation of the current pricing (equal to cost) and estimate resulting welfare. 
This scheme serves as a benchmark for comparison with other pricing analyses that 
follow.  Status-quo or pricing-at-cost scheme is used in demand function to project future 
demand. We then set the extraction rates to meet those demand levels. When these 
extraction rates begin to exceed the sustainable rate (above which some wells will turn 
saline), freshwater supply is supplemented with desalination. Since there is no watershed 
conservation, there is a chance of occurrence of an adverse watershed event that 
decreases the aquifer recharge. The structure of probability, recharge loss, and timing is 
exactly the same as in scenario 2. 
 
The results show that if the adverse watershed event does not occur, the price (=cost) 
rises from $0.16 to $0.3 (in the Fig.9, 10), and the minimum allowable head will be 
reached in 33 years as the head level from the current 22 feet to 15 feet (Fig. 12, 13). If 
the adverse event does occur, the price rises from $0.16 to $0.3 (in the Fig.9, 11) and and 
the minimum allowable head will be reached in 25 years as the head level from the 
current 22 feet to 15 feet (Fig. 12, 14). Since the price is set equal to the cost, the scarcity 
rent is zero, $1.612 billion less than the case of efficiency pricing with conservation (no 





 Honolulu, Status-quo pricing (= cost), No Conservation 
Stage 1 (20 years) 
Figure 9 













Event does not occur (Probability 90 %) – no loss of recharge 
Figure 10 













Event occurs (Probability 10 %) – 30 % loss of recharge 
Figure 11 








Dollars Optimal Price and Cost
Cost
 
 Honolulu, Status-quo pricing (= cost), No Conservation 
Stage 1 (20 years) 
Figure 12 











Event does not occur (Probability 90 %) – no loss of recharge 
Figure 13 












Event occurs (Probability 10 %) – 30 % loss of recharge 
Figure 14 








 3.4. Welfare Comparisons 
3.4.1. Consumer Surplus 
As shown in Table 1, present value of the consumer surplus is larger under efficiency 
pricing than under status-quo, and it is also larger with conservation than without. Also, 
as expected, consumer surplus is larger when the adverse event does not occur than when 
it does occur.  
Table 1 
Present Values (billion $) of Consumer Surplus 
Adverse Event 
(30% loss) 
0.795  Status-quo pricing, no 
conservation 
No Event  1.86 
Adverse Event  1.82  Efficiency pricing, no 
conservation 
No Event  2.6 





The revenue collected through scarcity rent is the largest under efficiency pricing with 
conservation scenario and zero under status-quo (which has price = cost). 
Table 2 
Present Values (billion $) of Revenue  
Adverse Event  0  Status-quo pricing, no 
conservation 
No Event  0 
Adverse Event  0.906  Efficiency pricing, no 
conservation 
No Event  1.44 
Efficiency pricing with  
conservation 
No Event  1.61 
 
 The revenue, generated by the difference between price and cost, can be returned to the 
consumers (assuming a balanced budget) using a block-pricing scheme. In block pricing, 
first few hundred gallons (block) of the total water consumption of each consumer are 
charged a (zero or) lower price than the cost (causing a revenue loss), and any 
consumption over and above that block is charged efficiency price
2 (causing a revenue 
gain). Choosing appropriate block size and price, the revenue gain from efficiency 
pricing can be returned to the consumers through the revenue loss from block pricing. 
Under efficiency pricing with conservation scenario, the block of size of 118 gallons a 
day can be provided to each consumer for free to recycle the revenue raised in the first 
period. As the scarcity rent and consumption rise over time, so does the revenue raised. 
Returning this revenue requires increasing the block size over time. Assuming the 
number of consumers remains the same in Honolulu (using the DBEDT projections), the 
free block size reaches 945 gallons per consumer per day in 50 years. 
 
3.4.3. Dynamic Benefit Taxation with Profligacy 
  In addition to the efficiency losses associated with status quo consumption and the 
failure to invest in conservation, there is an intergenerational equity problem.  Inasmuch 
as additional consumer surplus is derived in the present through profligacy, benefit 
taxation requires that these benefits (which are less than the costs  imposed on future 
consumers) be taxed away.  The corresponding consumer surplus figures are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
                                                 
2 As long as the size of the block is set small enough such that the consumers always use more than the 
block volume, the consumers pay efficiency price at their marginal consumption (and the incentives for 
optimal water use are unchanged). Table 3 




81.46 85.8  Status-quo 
pricing, no 





84 123.3  Efficiency 
pricing, no 
conservation  No 
Event 
84 152 
Efficiency pricing with 
conservation (no event) 
86 183.7 
 
By comparing the two columns, we see the gains in net benefits in various time periods.  
In this sense moving to conservation pricing is Pareto improving in all time periods.    
 
4. Conclusion 
We derive time paths of efficiency prices and compare the resulting welfare gains with 
the status-quo pricing policy. The analysis in this paper shows that welfare will be 
enhanced by switching to efficiency prices and the need for the expensive desalination 
technology can be delayed by nearly two decades. 
 
Although efficiency pricing alone improves welfare, we also analyze the effects of 
watershed conservation on water availability and welfare. Incorporating the risk of 
decreased aquifer recharge, we show that watershed conservation combined with 
efficiency pricing is welfare superior to efficiency pricing without conservation. The 
analysis also demonstrates water management under risk. In the period before the adverse 
water shed event is likely to happen, the optimal prices take into account both the 
probability of loss of recharge in future. When the event does happen, the price jumps up to adjust for the new information available. Similarly, if the event does not happen when 
it was expected to, the price jumps downward. 
 
Finally, we compare the revenue collected under different pricing schemes and show that 
largest revenue is raised under efficiency pricing with conservation. To return it back to 
the consumer, we propose a block pricing system that provides a certain initial amount of 
water to the consumers free. Because the water provided free costs to extract and 
distribute, this system allows for return of revenue generated by the difference between 
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